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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
EV AN P. JONES,

Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.

No. 10622

LOGAN CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff to obtain an injunction enjoining Logan City Corporation from destroying
Plaintiff's house pursuant to an order of Logan City's
Board of Condemnation finding the house to be a menace
to public safety.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court and the Court entered
a judgment for the defendant dismissing plaintiff's complaint and holding the Logan City Ordinance constitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment
in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law, or that failing, for
-1-

a modification of the judgment permitting plaintiff to
appear before the Logan City Board of Condemnation and
present evidence showing plaintiff's house is not a menace
to public safety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A short time prior to June 2, 1965, the Chairman of
the Logan City Condemnation Board investigated the
property owned by the plaintiff. He said that he felt the
conditions of the home on the property required a hearing by the Logan City Board of Condemnation. The
house was constructed over sixty years ago and prior to
the enactment of Logan City Ordinances No. 120 through
No. 125. The house is located on a block where there
are similar houses, constructed about the same time and
of the same material which are also still being used.
(Tr. 11-13)
The Chairman of the Board, the chief of the city fire
department, and the other two members of the board, the
city health officer and the building inspector, prepared
and signed a notice that a hearing would be held on
June 16, 1965 at the Logan City Commission Office,
On June 2, 1965 a copy of this notice was mailed addressed to Evan P. Jones and Veda P. Jones at 188 West
5th North Street, Logan, Utah, and was sent by certified
mail, return receipt requested. The Post Office returned
the letter as unclaimed. (Tr. 17-19) At this time and
for the past twelve years, the plaintiff, Evan P. Jones, has
resided at Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 12) The Chairman of the
Logan City Condemnation Board knew that Evan P.
Jones resided at Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 27) On or about
-2-

June 2, 1965 a copy of the notice was also poste<l on the
property in question located at 476 North 2nd West in
Logan. The defendant introduced testimony from a 15
\ear old neighbor across the street who admitted that
every day his mother had to look out her kitchen window
at the house while she washed dishes and she thought it
was very unsightly. (Tr. 31-32) This young neighbor
said that sometime after school was out he saw the plaintiff take the notice off the house. Mr. Jones, testified
that he hadn't been in Logan during that summer, th'.lt
lte had never received notice of the proceedings and that
the only notice, oral or written, he had received was a
letter dated October 1.5, 1965, advising him that since
the time for appeal had expired, his house would be destroyed on October 25, 1965. (Tr. 12-14).
The Chairman of the Logan City Condemnation
Board testified that a hearing was held on June 16, 1965,
hut neither Veda P. Jones nor the plaintiff, Evan P. Jones
were present. Over the objection of the plaintiff a purported copy of the Board's findings that the building and
stmcture located on the property constituted "a menace
to public safety" and ordering it "demolished" within
sixty days was introduced in evidence. The original record of such finding nor a certified copy of the same were
not presented for admission and no explanation was made
as to why they were not available.
An alleged copy of the original finding was served
on Veda P. Jones, but even though the Chairman of the
Logan City Board of Condemnation knew Evan P. Jones
resided in Paris, Idaho, no copy of the finding was ever
SPrvecl on him or mailed to him at that address.
-3-

On or about October 20, 1965, the plaintiff received
a letter advising him that his house would be destroyed
on October 25, 1965 as the time for appeal had expired
and on that day he commenced this action.
The Chairman of the Logan City Board of Condemnation admitted that there was no written standard from
which it could be determined whether or not a building
constituted a menace to public safety and he also admitted
that his decision and those of the other members of thr
board was "subjective." (Tr. 27). On redirect examination the Chairman said that his decision was also partly
based on his knowledge of some fire ordinance which was
never introduced in evidence. (Tr. 28).
At the trial the defendant Logan City asked the
Chairman of the Board of Condemnation to discuss the
facts upon which he based his decision. This question
was objected to by the plaintiff because the defendant
had not alleged in its answer that the plaintiff's house was
a "menace to public safety" nor that it was a "nuisance."
Therefore it was plaintiff's construction of the pleadings
that the defendant Logan City was proceeding on the
theory that it was beyond the power of the Court to
review the determination by the Logan City Board of
Condemnation as its finding that the plaintiff's house
constituted a "menace to public safety" was final except
for review by the Board of Adjustment of Logan City.
The Court apparently agreed with plaintiff's understanding as it sustained plaintiff's objection to the offered testimony. (Tr. 23-2.5).
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Logan City
was proceeding under Ordinance Nos. 120 through Nos.
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125 (Exhibits 1-6) which was admitted in Defendant's
;dlS\Vl'L

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I: The District Court erred in holding that Logan
City had authority to redelegate to a Board of Conrlemnation the power to legislate or adjudicate the
conditions under which a house constitutes a "menace
to pnblic safety."
POINT II: The District Court erred in holding that the
Logan City Board of Commissioners had established
an adequate standard under which a City Board of
Condemnation could determine when a house constituted a "menace to public safety."
Point III: The District Court erred in holding that Logan
City had authority to demolish a residence in absence
of an immediate threat to safety without affording
the owner an opportunity to repair the same.
POINT IV: The District Court erred in not requiring
Logan City to use good faith in giving notice to the
owner of a house prior to determining that it should
be demolished.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LOGAN CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO REDELECATE TO A BOARD A LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL
POWER TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A
"i\IEN ACE TO PUBLIC SAFETY."

-.5-

It seems to be well settled in this state that a city

organized under the general law only has such powers as
are given to it by the state legislature. That a municipal
corporation in the exercise of all its duties including those
most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the
State. See Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River Water Works
Inv. Co., 16 Utah 440, 52 P. 697, 41 LR.A. 305; Salt Lake
City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234; Wadsworth v.
Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P2d 161; Walton v. Tracy
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P2d 724; Salt Lake City
v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124, P2d 537; Ritholz v. City
of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702. The Utah
Supreme Court has said:
"We are committed to the principle that cities have
none of the elements of sovereignty .. " ( Nasfell v.
Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 346, 249 P 2d 507).
"A city organized and operating under general law
may possess and exercise only the powers granted in
express words (by an act of the legislature) and such
as are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted or those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation and
not merely convenient but indispensable." (Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, supra.)
" .. any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning
the existence of the power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation (city) and the power denied."
(Salt Lake City v. Revene, supra.)
In enacting Ordinances Nos. '120 through 125 it appears that Logan City proceeded under the general grant
of legislative power given to the board of commissioners
in Section 10-6-79, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the
-6-

specific authority contained in Section 10-8-52, U. C. A.
1953:

"They may define fire limits and prescrible limits
within which no building shall be constructed except
of brick, stone or other incombustible material, without permission, and may cause the destruction or
removal of any building constructed or repaired in
violation of any ordinance, and cause all buildings
and enclosures which may be in a dangerous state
to be put in a safe condition, or removed."
or in Section 10-8-60, U. C. A. 1953:
"They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and
abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist."
But none of the cited statutes give the Board of Commissioners the power to redelegate their legislative power to
a Board of a city.
In Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 67, 48 P. 150, the
city by ordinance defined the fire limits and provided
that no buildings could be erected within such limits of
combustible material. The Court said:
"The erection of buildings with combustible materials
may be prohibited by ordinance, and the granting of
permission for the erection of such building may
likewise, by ordinance, be regulated and restricted.
Such was doubtless the intention of the legislah1re.
The power thus conferred by the legislature upon
the city council is, however, of a legislative character, and may not be delegated by the council to
a committee. Such power being vested in the council, it must be exercised by it."

-7-

The city also added a provision that the "Committee on
Buildings" may establish regulations and restrictions under which a combustible building could be erected. The
court said:
"By adding the proviso, however, the council has attempted to confer upon a committee, not only an
absolute power, which would enable it to defeat the
very object of the ordinance at its mere will and
pleasure, but also a legislative power, which would
enable it to perform a duty imposed upon the council
itself by the statute, and that is to provide regulations and restrictions to control the granting of permission according to the provisions of the ordinance.
This the council had no power to do ... while a citv
council in this state may prohibit, by ordinance, the
construction of buildings, within fire limits, or combustible material, still it cannot confer a power upon
a committee, such as is attempted to be conferred by
the proviso, which may be used as a means for unjust
and arbitrary discrimination between citizens. If
this proviso were valid, then, no matter what regulations and restrictions the committee might adopt, it
would still be within its power to grant permission
to one person to erect a wooden building, and refuse
the privilege to another under the same circumstances. The statute vested in the council the exercise of powers of legislation respecting the establishing of fire limits and the construction of buildings
therein. This demands a discretion in the council
itself, and cannot be delegated.
In Logan City the Board of Commissioners have
given the Board of Condemnation the discretionary power
to determine when a building is in a dangerous state and
to direct whether it shall be put in a safe condition or
removed. In Ordinance No. 120:
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"Said board of condemnation is hereby granted the
power .. to find and determine whether any building or other structure constitutes a menace to public
safety."
and in Ordinance No. 124:
"Every building found by the board of condemnation
to constitute a menace to .. public safety, shall, if
11ot destroyed .. within the time allowed by and in
accordance with the finding of the board, shall be
deemed, and every such building is hereby declared
to be a public nuisance and every such nuisance may
he abated summarily by the building inspector under
the order and direction of the board of condemnation."
The Board of Condemnation can thus use its power
as "a means for unjust and arbitrary discrimination between citizens" as it has done by proceeding against plaintiff's house even though there are others on the same
block built of the same material at the same time. (Tr.
13).
Even where the legislature has authorized a city to
establish a board the Court has said that the Board of
Commissioners cannot delegate their legislative powers.
In Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., supra. the Court
said:

"It requires no citation of authority to establish that
the Commission could not delegate to the Board or
any other administrative officer its legislative powers
or functions . .
"The powers of the Board (of adjustment) are the
same as the powers of the Inspector and that in pass-
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ing on appeals the Board may only do that which the
inspector may have done in the first instance."
The difference between what the Board of Commissioners
may do and what the Board of Condemnation can do is
the difference between legislative or judicial powers and
ministerial functions. As said in State Tax Commission
v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P2d 120:
"Where judgment and discretion are required of
municipal officers they cannot be delegated without
express legislative authority." (Quoting from Jewell
Belting Co. v. Village of Bertha, 91 Minn. 9, 97 N. W.
424, 425.)
The Court also defined a ministerial act:
"The duty is ministerial, when the law, exacting its
discharge, prescribes and defines the time, mode and
occasion of its performance, with such certainty that
nothing remains for judgment or discretion. (Citing
Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54 Am. Rep. 65)
"A Ministerial act may be defined to be one which
a person performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety of the acts being
done. (Citing 2 Bouv, Law Diet., 416; 27 Cyc.
793) ."
The Court found that the ascertainment by the auditor
that there should be a penalty on the tax because of no
negligence, intentional disregard, or fraud was a quasi
judicial function which could not be delegated by the
Commission.
Here the Chairman of the Logan City Board of Condemnation admitted that there was no written standard
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from which plaintiff or any other person could determine
whether or not his building was a menace to public
,afety. The chairman admitted that his decision and that
of the other members of the board was "subjective,"
(Tr. 27) which is defined by Webster (New Collegiate
Dictionary, 1958) as "exhibiting or affected by personal
bias, emotional background, etc." In other words the
sole decision is with the members of the Board to exercise their own judgment as to whether a building or
house constih1tes a "menace to public safety." The Logan
City Board of Commissioners has completely delegated
:ill its legislative and judicial power to make the decision. The ascertainment of whether a menace to public
safety existed and whether it should be destroyed or
repaired was a quasi judicial function if not legislative
function. As stated in State Tax Commission of Utah
v. Katsis, supra. "From the principles laid down above,
this could not be delegated" to the Board of Condemnation.
POINT II
PRIVATE PROPERTY CANNOT BE DESTROYED AS
BEING A NUISANCE BY A CITY'S BOARD OF CONDEMNATION IN ABSENCE OF A STANDARD TO
CONTROL AND GUIDE THE BOARD.
The plaintiff alleged and the defendant admitted that
in proceeding to demolish plaintiff's house the defendant
was acting under Ordinances Nos. 120 through 125. No
other ordinance which established a standard for the
action of the Board of Condemnation was introduced in
evidence. The Chairman of the Board of Condemnation
-11-

admitted that there was no written standard upon whil'h
his decisions and those of the members of the board were
based. Their decision was "subjective." (Tr. 27).
In a concurring opinion in Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 178, 192, P2d 563, Justice Latimer
states the general rule:
" .. the act is defective in that the lack of standards
to control and guide the administrative agency, permits the agency to be unfettered and uncontrolled,
and the sole judge of what may or may not be for
the welfare of the people . and therefore, the powers
delegated are too broad and sweeping. This renders
the act unconstitutional."
At page 173 he also says:
"It is impossible to find any definite standards in
the act to guide the board, other than its discretion
as to what is good and proper for the health and
safety of the public."
The only standard the Logan City Board of Commissioners
has given the Board of condemnation is whether the building is a "menace to public safety." This is a complete
abdication of the Board of Commissioners power to determine whether a building is "in a dangerous state"
which was delegated by the legislature in Section 10-8-52,
supra. It also gives the Board of Condemnation the power
to determine when a home is a "menace to public safety"
and notwithstanding such determination the next day an
identical home could be determined not to be a "menace
to public safety" by the same Board as there is nothing in
the ordinance that requires a uniform rule of action by
the Board of Condemnation.
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The general rule is stated in 37 Am. Jur. Municipal
Corporations Section 160 at page 778:
" .. it is established, that any municipal ordinance
which vests an arbitrary discretion in public administrative officials with reference to the rights, property, or business of individuals, without prescribing a
uniform rule of action, making the enjoyment of such
rights depend upon arbitrary choice of the officers
without reference to all persons of the class to which
the ordinance is intended to be applicable, and without furnishing any definite standard for the control
of the officers, is unconstitutional, void and beyond
the powers of a municipality."
Jn People v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204, 128 N. E. 377, an
ordinance permitting destruction by officers of "any building, or other structure, which for want of proper repair,
or by reason of age and dilapidated condition, or for any
cause, is especially liable to fire, and which is so situated
as to endanger other buildings or property, or so occupied
that fire would endanger persons or property therein . "
was held not to supply a sufficient standard to meet constitutional requirements.

In Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. 322 Mo.
:342, 15 S. W. 2d 343, "any building, any structure or
part thereof that is unsafe as to fire or for the purpose
used, or has become unsafe from fire, decay, or other
causes, . " was held to be an insufficient standard the
Court saying that the council could have fixed a standard
for the guidance of the administrative body.
In Gulf Ref. Co. v. Dallas (Texas) 10 S. W. 2d 151,
"the nearness or proximity to existing dwelling houses"
-13-

or that "the health of adjacent inhabitants will be greath
menaced or in danger or would seriously offend th;,
morals, good health, convenience, comfort, prosperity and
general welfare of those residing in said district" was an
insufficient standard and violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because "The
ordinance does not define the degree of hurt, injury or
inconvenience to make the structure an undesirable one ..
hut vests in the building inspector the right to exercise
his own personal views."
Not only does the Logan city ordinance vest in tl1c
Board of Condemnation the right to exercise their own
personal views, but the Chairman of the Board of Condemnation admits that this is in fact what is done in
1caching a decision. (Tr. 27).

In Bennington v. Hawks, 100 Vt. 37, 134 A. 638, ,5()

A.L.R. 983, the court said:

"In order to make the increased fire hazard a basis
for declaring a building a public nuisance, it must
be shown that it unnecessarily and unreasonably increases that hazard .. Its hazardous character must
be unmistakable and the dangers therefrom so imminent and extraordinary as to make an irreparable
result probable rather than possible."

No such limitation is placed on the Logan City Board of
Condemnation. Indeed as plaintiff understands the defendant's position and the decision of the lower Court,
it is within the authority of the city to permit its officers
to exhibit personal bias or emotional background in determining whether or not a building is a "menace to pnblice safety." In this case the city did not plead in its
-14-

answer that the plaintiff's home was in fact a "menace to
public safety" and therefore the action of the city was
lawful. As a result the plaintiff objected to any evidence
]wing introduced on the subject. The plaintiff wanted
the court to proceed on the issue that regardless of
whether or not plaintiff's home is a "menace to public
":afcty" does a Board of a City have the power to determine that fact and destroy plaintiff's home without any
provision for review by the City Commission"', the courts
without any delegation of legislative authority to cities
to allow a Board to so determine and without any standard
established by a city ordinance as to what conditions the
lJOard must find before it can determine that a building
is a "menace to public safety." If the Board does not
have to find that there is a structural weakness in the
house which would make it unsafe to remain standing
under the weight of the occupants and contents, or that
the heating system does not keep the heat below the
point of combustion of surrounding combustible materials
or some other standard showing an actual danger to the
public, then regardless of the Court's review and determination that plaintiff's building is not a nuisance, is not
a "menace to public safety" in the Court's opinion, the
Court would still be required to uphold the action of the
Board which has already been shown to be arbitrary with
1 egard to the plaintiff.
"It should be noted that the appeal provision in Ordinance
No. 122 does not provide for appeal to the City Commissioners, but to the Board of Adjustment composed of City Judge, Chief of Police, and two other citizens and taxpayers
appointed by the Mayor as provided in Ordinance No. 101
creating a Board of Adjustment and providing that one
member of Zoning Commission shall serve on the Board.
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It has been said in 39 Am. Jur. Nuisances, Section
l 90, page 467:
"Usually in suits of this character the burden is on
the defendant to prove a justification. So, in a suit
to restrain city officials from destroying property as
a nuisance, the burden is on the city of showing that
it is in fact a nuisance, by competent evidence, the
same as any other fact is established, and evidence is
not admissible of a finding of public officials that it
is a nuisance . "
The defendant Logan City, having failed to plead that
plaintiff's home is in fact a nuisance and, therefore, not
having been able to offer evidence in support thereof,
should be held enjoined from having plaintiff's house
demolished as being a nuisance. The finding of the
Board as indicated above is not evidence that plaintiff's
house is a nuisance and in view of the requirements of
Section 78-2.5-16 as to evidence of the contents of a writing there is a question whether or not the finding should
have been admitted in evidence, since the Board did not
produce the original nor explain that it had been recorded
and this was a copy thereof or afford the plaintiff any
other means of determining whether or not the finding
of the Board was as offered.

In fact the alleged findings by the Board is not a
"finding" at all, but a mere conclusion of law based on
no facts which appear in the alleged order of the Board
of Condemnation. Without any knowledge of the facts
upon which such conclusion was based, plaintiff is helpless to know what steps he should take to repair his house
if it in fact has any defects which constitutes it a menace
to public safetv.
-16-

POINT III
THE AUTHORITY OF CITIES IN RELATION TO
RUILDINGS IN A DANGEROUS STATE (NOT PRESENTING AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO SAFETY SO
AS TO REQUIRE IMMEDIATE DESTRUCTION) IS
LIMITED TO DIRECTING REPAIR OR REMOVAL.
At the hearing on the temporary restraining order the
Court indicated to the parties that they should try to
settle the matter. Accordingly the plaintiff in good faith
had his attorney write to Logan City offering to paint
his house, put in new windows, and install a new furnace.
If this was not sufficient the plaintiff requested advice
as to what additional requirements the City would impose.
The City replied by showing the plaintiff's attorney
a copy of a report of the building inspector which plaintiff felt and the Court seemed to agree was not a sufficient
reply by Logan City. (Tr. 4-6). The plaintiff would
still like to know what requirements the City has in order
to preserve his house from destruction. But since the
decision of the Board of Condemnation is that his house
!Je destroyed it appears that Logan City has usurped the
authority granted by Section 10-8-52, supra., in not giving
plaintiff an opportunity to repair his house. It seems
evident that his house does not impose such an immediate
threat to public safety that it must immediately be destroyed since it has been standing without objection from
anyone between June 16, 1965, the date of the original
finding and October 15, 1965, the date of the letter from
the Board of Condemnation.
-17-

The Utah Legislature has said (Section 10-8-.52,
supra.) that the city may cause all buildings and en
closures which may be in a dangerous state to be put ilJ
a safe condition, or removed. The plaintiff has not been
given an opportunity to put his house in a safe condition
and if the lower court is sustained his house will be destroyed without his ever having that opportunity. The
plaintiff believed that the Court's comments indicated that
if the ordinance was constitutional the plaintiff would
be entitled to action by the Logan City Board of Commissioners. (Tr. 5).

It is respectfully submitted that if the Supreme Court

finds against the Plaintiff on the other points, the limitations of power held by Municipal Corporations discussed
under Point No. I above should permit the Court to provide that Logan City must re-open the hearing to pennit
evidence as to what must be done in order to put plaintiff's house in a safe condition and there must be a finding
by the Board of Condemnation on this point.
POINT IV.
A PROPERTY OWNER IS ENTITLED TO THE EXERCISE OF GOOD FAITH BY THE CITY IN GIVING
NOTICE OF A HEARING FOR DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY.
If the Court finds against the Plaintiff on the above
points it is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff should
be entitled to have a hearing on whether or not his house
is in fact a "menace to public safety." Ordinance No. 120
provides that the notice of the hearing should be mailed
to the owner at his "last known address." The Chairman
-18-

the lloard of Condemnation admits that he knew that
tht' plaintiff resides in Paris, Idaho. (Tr. 27). The plaintiffs uncontradicted testimony is that he has resided there
for the past twelve years. (Tr. 12).
0j

The lower Court found that the plaintiff had actual
notice of the hearing on the basis of the testiminy of a
neighbor hoy, age 1.5 years, that he saw plaintiff take the
notice off the house. The plaintiff does not question the
right of the Court to believe the testimony of a 15 year
uld neighbor whose mother does not enjoy looking at her
neighbor's house as opposed to plaintiff's testimony that
be had not been in Logan during that summer. But the
question is whether the rights of property owners should
depend solely on the testimony of a boy.
Our rule with regard to service of summons requires
it to be served by a person over the age of 21 years (Rule
4 (d) (1), Rules of Civil Procedure, U. C. A. 1953.) In
Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 Pac. 215 the Utah
Supreme Court requires an affidavit in good faith as to
the last known residence where service could not be had
personally on the defendant. In Perkins v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468, 243 P2d 446, the Supreme Court required strict
compliance with the alternate to personal service. In that
case the circumstances were very similar to the situation
here. A copy of the decision of the Board was served on
Mrs. Veda Jones who is separated from her husband and
lives in Logan, but no copy was mailed to the Plaintiff
who lives in Paris, Idaho so he had no chance to appea]
the decision. In the Perkins case a copy of the notice
was left with the wife, but no copy was mailed to the
husband at his last known address.
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It is respectfully submitted that if the Court finds
that the City Commission can delegate such a wide discretion to its Board of Condemnation which permits it to
destroy a property owner's home without being governed
by any standard, and without affording the property
owner an opportunity to repair the same, then the Court
should also impose a high standard of fairness on the
Board in its procedures. So that where the Chairman
of the Board knows the plaintiff's address and does not
mail a notice to him at that address, the Board should
be required to re-open its proceedings for a determination
as to whether or not the plaintiff can present evidence
of the soundness of his home which will change the personal bias of the members of the Board and permit plaintiff to retain his house.

Respectfully submitted,
Ted S. Perry
Attorney for Plaintiff-appellant
106 Church Ave.
Logan, Utah
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